

# The ORANGE


**NEWSLETTER OF THE ORANGE DEMOCRATIC  
MOVEMENT PARTY OF KENYA**

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## A Time for Change



# A Time For Change

*It is a time to change. The country is at a crossroads. It is necessary to chart a new way forward. Everything that could be wrong is going wrong. Due to economic and political mismanagement the economy is on the brink of collapse. In view of these recent events institutions of governance including the executive, parliament and judiciary have been discredited.*

The promises that were made by the Kenya Kwanza (KK) coalition during the campaigns have turned out to have been largely misleading gimmicks meant to procure votes by false pretence. For those who had had any hopes that given time the KK regime would put its act together and redeem its image it is now obvious that it has no such intentions.

The regime has not only excelled in inventing and ruthlessly imposing new punitive taxes on everything and on everyone but have accelerated and surpassed the borrowing craze of the last decade with absolutely nothing tangible to show for the mounting debt. It is widely believed that most of these debts are odious and procured to be squandered just like the tax revenues as routinely reported by Controller of

Budget and the Auditor General reports. The ongoing political and economic crisis in the country precipitated by the escalating widespread rebellion and uprising of a broad section of society spearheaded by young people popularly referred to as the Gen Z presents threats as well as opportunities for the country.

## The Storming of Parliament

The occurrence of the storming of the 25th June 2024 will be remembered as a turning point in our politics and especially in the relationship between the people and their delegates i.e. the national executive, the legislature and the judiciary.

On that day demonstrators stormed parliament, the Supreme Court and the Office of the Governor Nairobi County. The occurrences followed day-long demonstrations against the unpopular punitive 2024/2025 Finance Bill. During the public participation sessions mandated by the constitution over 80% of the petitions were against the government Bill. Nevertheless the government leaning Members of Parliament (MPs) stubbornly went ahead to pass the bill even as parliament was besieged by the angry demonstrators who had threatened to occupy parliament if

the MPs did not heed the public calls not to approve the punitive tax bill.

By storming and occupying parliament on that day the people signified that they had completely lost faith in the powers delegated to parliament and the other organs of the state especially the national executive that had put forth the unpopular bill and was reported to have not only pressurised the MPs at a meeting in State House but also induced them with Kshs 2 million bribes per MP attending the meeting to ignore public opinion and pass the bill

The demonstrators were reported to have also threatened to storm and occupy State House the seat of the President on that day. These tumultuous and traumatic experiences saw several demonstrators being gunned down leading to many deaths of young people on the grounds of parliament. Consequently the President was compelled to return the discredited bill to parliament with a memorandum to delete every clause of the bill. In spite of that retreat the demonstrations and demands have not ended forcing the president to also dismiss the cabinet. Even that has not caused cessation of rising anger, demonstrations and anxiety.

Clearly the old ways of ruling are no longer tenable and, by their actions, the people are invoking Article 1(1&2) of the Constitution of Kenya 2010 that provides that:

“All sovereign power belongs to the people of Kenya and shall be exercised only in accordance with this Constitution. (2) The people may exercise their sovereign power either directly or through their democratically elected representatives.” Under the circumstances it is clear that the government has lost credibility with the people and the people and the people have elected to exercise their powers and authority directly. It is now necessary to chart a new way to a new Kenya. The new Kenya can only be birthed through new transitional organs.

## The Need For National Convention

The party must advance its political engagement with the ongoing revolutionary moment by seeking collaborative frameworks within which to bring the desired changes. There is urgent need for a peoples dialogue to institute transitional governance arrangements. The outcome of such an agenda should determine the way forward for the country. It is a time to change.

# Kenya, what's to be done: Dialogue or Revolution?

**K**enya stands at a precipice, teetering between revolutionary transformation and chaotic upheaval. The discontent against the Kenya Kwanza regime, led by President William Ruto, has ignited nationwide protests and unleashed a wave of anger that has long been simmering beneath the surface. Over the past month, this unrest has spread to over 40 of Kenya's 47 counties, with the younger generation, particularly Generation Z, at the forefront. As the nation grapples with its future, two potential scenarios emerge: a downfall of the current regime or a new beginning through transformative change.

The first scenario – the Downfall Scenario – encapsulates the possibility of the regime's collapse, which can unfold through the following five pathways: The first pathway is the Limping Sheep Pathway. In this situation, the regime finds itself cornered but clings to power with little to no support, akin to a limping sheep attempting to lead the flock. This scenario is perilous for the nation, as it leads to stagnation and rampant looting by those

who perceive their time is running out. Under such circumstances, Ruto could become more ruthless, reminiscent of Moi's regime post-1982 coup attempt.

The Second is the Survival Imperative Pathway. Facing the brink of collapse, the regime might be forced to make significant concessions to survive. These include, but are not limited to, offers for a government of national unity or accepting difficult reforms. Desperate to survive the Gen Z-led onslaught, Ruto has already dissolved his entire cabinet (later recycling six members) and has been trying to woo Azimio la Umoja Coalition for what he calls a broad-based government. If this pathway is taken, it is crucial to extract a limited mandate, calling for early elections and implementing key constitutional, legal, and institutional changes to stabilize the nation.

The third pathway is fomenting either an Explosion or Implosion of the regime. An intervention by state or non-state agencies could trigger a rapid collapse of the regime. Internal rebellion from within the

regime's supporters or an impeachment process could hasten this downfall. On Tuesday, July 23, a petition demanding the impeachment of Ruto and his deputy, Rigathi Gachagua, citing 31 grounds of the violation of the Constitution, was filed by a civil society group Kenya Tuitakayo. The intervention could also come from an increasingly discontented populace demanding accountability.

The fourth pathway, the 'Chaos' Imperative is also feasible. Without a definitive organization to direct actions and provide a way out, anarchy could reign. This could lead to statelessness, disintegration, and the rise of militias. The absence of leadership and coherent strategy would push the nation towards a breakdown of order and governance.

The fifth pathway is the Interventionist Imperative. Given Kenya's strategic importance as a financial hub and the location of UN headquarters, the international community might step in to dictate the country's future. This scenario resembles a "Haiti moment," where

external forces determine the nation's trajectory, potentially undermining Kenya's sovereignty. Scenario Two is the charting of A New Beginning. This scenario offers the hope of transformative change, presenting several possible avenues. The first is shortcircuiting a potentially revolutionary pathway through a political elite consensus. Through this avenue, political leaders might broker a power-sharing deal to maintain the status quo. While this might temporarily stabilize the country, it would defer the transformational moment Kenyans yearn for, perpetuating the cycle of political compromise and incremental reforms.

Avenue Two is Transformative Constitutionalism. A revisit to the constitution could address pending reforms and reconfigure the nation's governance structure. Key issues to be tackled include devolution (possibly creating Bomas regions), deciding between a presidential or parliamentary system, and considering mixed-member pro-

portional representation. This pathway offers a structured approach to creating a more equitable and representative governance system.

The third, built around The National Question, is the pursuit of a National Democratic Revolution (NDR) signifying a radical overhaul of the current system. This would involve a comprehensive reformation of political, economic, and social structures to align with the aspirations of the Kenyan populace, driven by the demands for justice, equity, and inclusion.

The fourth and final avenue is the crafting of a New Frontier. The emergence of a new political and social frontier, driven by innovative ideas and the energy of the younger generation, could lead to the establishment of new norms and practices. This pathway hinges on the active participation and leadership of Gen Z, whose vision and activism could redefine Kenya's future.

To navigate these scenarios, several flight paths to change are proposed:

### 1. Call for a National Conversation

A national conversation is essential, but it should not be orchestrated by the ruling party or its leadership. Instead, it should be inclusive, comprising a significant proportion of Gen Z (at least 60%). This conversation should be internally driven, free from external manipulation, and aimed at forging a collective vision for the nation's future.

This is the flight path that ODM has been articulating since July 2 when the Party's Central Committee outlined the Party's position. This stance has been distorted by the media and detractors of the Party to portray ODM and its leadership as being ready to go to bed with Ruto and his UDA brigade. On Tuesday, July 23, 2024, ODM was forced to reiterate

this position when it emerged that some self-seeking individuals from amongst its ranks were angling for cabinet appointments.

### 2. Strategic Litigation

Legal challenges can be a potent tool for change. Key areas for litigation include the independence of the Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC), resisting the IMF/World Bank's control over economic policies, and addressing issues such as conflict of interest and gross violations of the constitution and human rights.

Several political actions are necessary to build momentum for change. These include but are not limited to: triggering a mini-general election by recalling anti-people MPs; launching a popular initiative to disband the regime, adopting limited constitutional changes, and holding new elections through a referendum; pursuing removal from office through legislative and judicial

action; and building a critical mass for change, uniting diverse groups under a National Coalition for Change.

To sum it up, Kenya's current revolutionary moment is a call to action. The excesses of the Kenya Kwanza regime, compounded by external political and economic pressures, have galvanized a populace ready for change.

Whether through a national conversation or more radical measures, the path forward must prioritize the aspirations and demands of the Kenyan people. As the nation stands at this critical juncture, the choices made now will define Kenya's future, determining whether it plunges into chaos or emerges stronger, more just, and more united.

# Affordable Housing Programme: A Con Game on Kenya's Poor

**Julius** Nyerere's assertion, "Maendeleo ni watu, si vitu (Development should focus on people, not things)," frames the critique of Kenya's affordable housing programme. The narrative begins with a tailor who, after being homeless and resorting to crime, gained skills in prison that allowed him to envision a stable life. This story sets the stage for discussing the broader crisis of social housing and how it impacts the poor.

An article by Kinuthia Ndung'u, an organizer with Kasarani Social Justice Centre, highlights the historical and current struggles of the poor in Kenya. Writing from Jevanjee Gardens in Nairobi, a site of historical significance and current social and political debates, he underscores the pervasive injustice surrounding affordable housing. Many gather at the park not out of political concern but because of their harsh realities, like the unemployed seeking work or low-wage workers returning from affluent neighborhoods.

The stark realities of life in Nairobi are depicted through the daily strug-

gles of those who gather in Jevanjee Gardens. They come together to share a meager meal, engage in discussions, and wait for bus fares to drop. Many live in substandard conditions or are homeless, constantly at risk of eviction and exploitation. The government's affordable housing initiative is a focal point of frustration and anger, with many seeing it as a deception rather than a solution.

Ndung'u recounts the stories of those affected by the government's housing policies. Homeless individuals often face brutal conditions, exacerbated by the government's actions. The demolition of homes in Mukuru Kwa Njenga in 2021 left many displaced and destitute. Legal battles have been fought and lost, further disenfranchising the poor. Similar demolitions in Kariobanji and Kibra have caused significant suffering, highlighting the government's disregard for the lives of the poor.

The Ruto affordable housing programme is criticized as being inaccessible to those it purports to help. While aimed at providing dignified living conditions,

the houses are priced beyond the reach of the poor. Instead, they cater to the middle class, leaving the most vulnerable without support. This disconnect between the government's stated intentions and the lived realities of the poor is a central theme in Ndung'u's critique.

Ndung'u asserts that the government's approach to homelessness and housing is fundamentally flawed. The system criminalizes homelessness, using police and county askaris to push the homeless out of sight. This strategy ignores the root causes of homelessness, such as economic disparity and lack of social support. Instead of addressing these issues, the government focuses on profit and cosmetic solutions that do not benefit the poor.

In addressing Bunge La Mwananchi (the People's Parliament), Ndung'u emphasizes that the housing crisis cannot be resolved without addressing the broader social issues. The government's focus on building homes for the middle class, while neglecting the needs of the poor, perpetuates inequality. He advocates for a pro-poor government that

would prioritize socialism, providing adequate housing, healthcare, education, and a clean environment for all. The article concludes with a call to recognize the systemic issues at play. Ndung'u underscores that the existing state, influenced by capitalists and landowners, is incapable of addressing the housing crisis effectively. Real change requires a shift in power and priorities, ensuring that development truly focuses on people, not just profit.

In summary, Kinuthia Ndung'u's article is a powerful critique of Kenya's affordable housing programme. It highlights the struggles of the poor, the disconnect between government policies and the needs of the people, and calls for a fundamental change in how housing and social issues are addressed. The narrative is a plea for a more just and equitable society where development prioritizes the well-being of all citizens.

The full text of this article is available at <https://mwamko.org/surviving-on-the-fringes-deception-of-social-housing/>

# How Congo's Wealth is Fueling Conflict

In an ornate room in Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) presidential palace in March 2015, some of global mining's most powerful men from Glencore, Randgold, Ivanhoe and other firms faced off against government officials over then proposed changes to the country's mining code. Facing the officials, including former President Joseph Kabila, the executives even threatened to close mines if the government went ahead with intended changes including royalty increases.

But there was no mistaking the sense of defeat as these men of massive economic power descended the red carpeted stairs after six hours to accept before the media a mining code that hiked taxes and removed exemptions for cobalt and other minerals. It was an extraordinary climb down for companies that had campaigned tooth-and-nail for six years for better terms, and Kabila signed the bill into law two days later.

International capital, however, does not cede territory that easily. The government of DRC had to be destabilised – and these multinational cor-

porations (MNCs) didn't have to look far to find willing collaborators. According to the Centre for Preventive Action, there were more than one hundred armed groups active in the country as at May 14, 2024, the most prominent being M23 and Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The former is dominated by the Banyamulenge – a Tutsi ethnic community in DRC, while ADF is reputed to be ISIS-affiliated.

Sometimes out of intellectual laziness, other times in an attempt to obscure the imperial hands at play, the Congo's never-ending crisis has been given an ethnic label and presented as a manifestation of African "tribes" unable to live peacefully together. The real motivation of the countries many little "civil wars" must be named – the control of the country's vast mineral resources by MNCs. The existence of different ethnic groups or nationalities cannot be denied.

However, an exclusive focus on conflict and violence obscures histories of cooperation and collaboration among these communities. Studies tracing individual life-stories in con-

flict-affected areas in eastern DRC shows that the social relationships between groups considered 'ethnic' are far more complex than the singular focus on conflict allows for.

"Blood pacts" between people of different communities, such as the Banyamulenge and the Bafuliiru provide a good example. These pacts – sometimes going back three centuries – were an expression of ritual kinship and created bonds of mutual assistance between families from different communities.

Violent conflict may have undone many of these older ties but mutual relations across 'ethnic' boundaries continue to the present. Moreover, in several villages, Banyamulenge and other communities still co-exist peacefully.

In the precolonial past, boundaries between 'ethnic' groups were never as rigid as they are today – neither in social nor in geographical terms. Kinship groups were often mobile and could attach and detach themselves to larger social collectives. Moreover, other forms of belonging, such as clan membership and initiation societies, were often at least as salient as

'ethnicity'.

But complex processes in the colonial era have made ethnicity a rigid and frontier notion. They have largely obscured the memories of these other modes of social existence and belonging. Indeed, colonial and precolonial history are often read through the lens of the present, leading to anachronistic thinking. A case in point is the division between 'autochthonous' and 'non-autochthonous' populations.

Near-constant population movements imply that few groups in the Kivus can actually claim to be original inhabitants of certain areas.

Moreover, labelling groups that migrated to the present-day Congo before international boundaries existed as foreigners or immigrants is anachronistic. What causes these groups to be considered outsiders is not the fact that they came from elsewhere. Rather, the artificial borders drawn by colonising powers at Berlin changed the way their former geographical areas of origins were considered.

Colonial government policies pertaining to the

organisation of customary power further changed the perceptions of these groups. For reasons that had more to do with colonial interests than with existing socio-political organisation, the colonisers granted certain Rwandophone groups customary governance units and others not.

Today, the absence of a colonially recognised form of ‘customary’ organisation is peddled as ‘proof’ of whether certain groups were present during the colonial era or not. However, this ‘criterion’ seems to be mostly applied to Rwandophone groups, and not the multiple other groups that were denied a chieftom, like the Batembo.

Moreover, in spite of being granted their own chieftaincy in the colonial era, the Barundi are today not always considered ‘autochthonous’ either. The Barundi are an ethnic group in Uvira territory who speak Kirundi, which is close to Kinyarwanda. Similar to the Banyamulenge, politicised discourses continue to label them as ‘nationals’ from a neighbouring country. At the same time, some groups that migrated from the present-day territories of Rwanda and Burundi are at present considered ‘autochthonous’. This is so for the

Bazige or Bahungu clans in Uvira territory. As these examples show us, invoking history to sustain claims to autochthony is often problematic. After years of plunder and heavy-handed rule by Mobutu Sese Seko, the people the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) took up arms and drove the dictator out of Kinshasha palace and the country. Since the onset of this war in 1996, the country has remained in a state of perpetual political and economic instability.

Caused by a spillover of conflict from the Rwandan genocide into the DRC (then named Zaire), the Congolese Wars took place over a span of seven years (1996 - 2003) and are the primary factor contributing to the instability within the region. Conflict remains rampant — even after the official conclusion of the Congolese Wars in 2003 — as several warlord-led militias funded by MNCs seek to gain control of the DRC’s massive mineral reservoirs. These minerals are dubbed “conflict minerals,” due to their part in funding conflicts within the DRC; at their peak in 2008, intrastate wars over conflict minerals in the DRC are reported to have killed 45,000 people a month. Conflict minerals are undoubtedly the DRC’s “resource curse”, as the elevated level of

demand for these minerals fuels conflict between rebel groups seeking to control mineral rich land and plunges the country further into instability.

The international trade in conflict minerals is profitable for both sellers (rebel militia groups) and buyers, the MNCs — thanks to favorable prices and the difficulty involved in tracing legitimate buyers to illegal sellers.

Tin ore (cassiterite), tungsten, tantalum (extracted from columbite-tantalite), and gold — collectively referred to as 3TG minerals — are the raw materials classified as conflict minerals due to their extraction from militia-controlled mines. The DRC houses the world’s largest deposits of these minerals as its mines contain several billion pounds worth around \$24 trillion.

The astronomical value assigned to 3TG minerals is a result of their necessity in the supply chains of electronic devices. 3TG minerals are essential in the process of constructing batteries, circuit wires, and processor chips due to their high conductivity and resistance to corrosive substances. Without these minerals, devices such as computers, phones, televisions, and tablets could not properly function. As such, 3TG minerals are the DRC’s most valuable

factor endowments and have the potential to generate copious amounts of revenue if properly exported. As it currently stands, warlord-led militia groups control around a third of the DRC’s mines and other natural repositories. According to United States of America’s intelligence report by the CIA, much of the DRC’s export revenue concerning minerals and ores is not accrued by legitimate state-approved actors — and therefore not reflected in economic data — but by militia groups instead. Consequently, the DRC cannot utilize the entirety of its vast amounts of natural resources and put funding towards developing infrastructure, establishing affordable healthcare, or providing quality education.

The international conflict mineral trade market contains several actors, including smelting/refining corporations, intermediary traders, mineral transporters, and component producers (which are companies that make basic mechanisms and devices and sell them to end product producers. However, the major economic players in international conflict mineral trade are the Congolese warlord-led militia groups funded and controlled by tech-centric multinational corporations operating outside of the

DRC. Both actors wield the most power out of all other groups involved, engage in the conflict mineral trade market to sustain their respective operations, and mutually benefit from trade.

In spite of controlling only one-third of the mines within the DRC,” warlord-led militia groups still control land which contains billions of dollars in untapped mineral reserves. The militia groups have no need for the 3TG minerals as resources to utilize in building or repairing electronic devices. Instead, they extract and sell conflict minerals on the black market, using them to obtain arms, munitions, food, and medical supplies. Conflict minerals aid militia groups in solidifying their regional dominance and are simply the most profitable and accessible resources for them.

During the price spike of columbite-tantalite in 2000, about “\$20 million a month went to rebel groups” to finance their war efforts. The main reason why militias can conduct such an operation while turning a massive profit is due to their low operating and opportunity costs. Essentially, militias have a comparative advantage in the extraction of 3TG minerals. Labor costs are non-existent and any physical capital needed is forcibly taken.

Militias regularly take over existing mines and utilize their labor force, which usually consists of children and teenagers forcefully conscripted from the surrounding villages. This allows militias to specialize in mineral extraction and trade minerals in exchange for products they need. Sometimes, militia groups choose not to dig for minerals themselves, instead selling individual diggers access to mining pits they control and taking a sizable percentage of the minerals these diggers discover. After extracting the minerals, militia members sell them to legitimate traders by bribing underpaid public officials to certify their minerals via the “tag and bag” system, which involves “tying a small plastic tag around a bag of minerals to [mark] it as ‘clean.’”

Although they never directly interact with the militia groups supplying 3TG minerals, MNCs are the main economic players in the international conflict mineral trade. MNCs that manufacture electronic devices at the end of the supply chain especially rely on cheap and reliable sources of 3TG minerals. In particular, major technology conglomerates such as Google, Apple, Intel, IBM, Microsoft, and Samsung often turn a blind eye and use “minerals sold

to fund combatants in the DRC in the manufacture of their products. MNCs are undoubtedly the most powerful actors in the conflict mineral trade market due to their financial strength

As the dominant players in the market, MNCs have the luxury of dictating the flow of minerals in accordance with their needs. In accordance with Wallerstein’s core-periphery model (which states that rich, “core countries” dictate the global flow of resources), MNCs based in rich countries control the amount of 3TG minerals suppliers in “periphery countries” (like the DRC) can sell. Suppliers in these countries solely rely on the demands of these MNCs. Coltan, the primary component in processor chips, only costs around \$69 per pound, a relatively low cost when one considers the number of chips manufactured using a pound of coltan (each processor only uses a couple grams of coltan).

While other areas like Afghanistan, Australia, and Canada also contain 3TG minerals, acquiring these minerals from the DRC has proved much cheaper and far less restrictive thanks to the presence of roaming private armies. Courtesy of the emergence of neo-liberal globalization, the supply chains of MNCs

engaging in the conflict mineral trade are extremely convoluted. Reuters observed that “after minerals are mined, they are sold to a middleman and usually taken to the country’s capital, where the metals are extracted and blended with other elements.” These blended compounds are then exported to countries where they are further refined and prepped for use in end products.

While militia groups and MNCs gain from the conflict mineral trade, it negatively impacts Congolese laborers and miners working for legitimate mining operations. In the DRC, around 8 to 10 million people rely on mining to earn a living. Particularly in the eastern Congo, mining is one of the only existing economic activities following the infrastructural destruction by the Congolese civil wars and militia violence. Legal mining operations are costly to operate and cannot compete with militia groups, which can afford to sell their minerals at far lower prices.

As a result, legal mining operations significantly lower their prices; in 2010, “miners were selling a kilogram of tin for \$7 [although] the world market price averaged \$18 dollars a kilo. Due to this competition, miners only earn one to five dollars a day, which



constitutes around fourteen hours of manual labour. Many of the miners are women, who support themselves and their children through their meager earnings.

The plunder of Congo by forces of global greed facilitated by the killings and displacement of people of Congo using their own kith and kin puts to shame the vision of the country Patrice Emory Lumumba lived and died for. Africa has a moral obligation to stand with the people of Congo. Absconding is not an option.



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PRESS RELEASE BY RT. HON. RAILA ODINGA, EGH;

#### CABINET APPOINTMENTS:

I have taken note of President William Ruto's announcement yesterday regarding the reconstitution of the cabinet to include four members from ODM.

As articulated in our statement on Tuesday, July 23, 2024, neither the ODM Party nor Azimio la Umoja One Kenya Coalition Party has entered into any coalition agreement with President Ruto's UDA party.

We had anticipated the crafting of clear terms of engagement based on issues we raised in our various communiqués.

While we extend our best wishes to the nominees and trust that they will contribute positively to national development, we continue to advocate for a national engagement under the conditions we have previously outlined as below:

1. Compensation to the families of the victims of extra-judicial executions and persons injured by the state since last year.
2. Release of all persons in custody and termination of all cases related to protests since last year.
3. Prosecution of policemen involved in shooting to kill or maim protestors.

ODM remains steadfast in upholding its foundational principles of democracy, good governance, and social justice. These principles shall at all times guide our actions and decisions as we strive for the betterment of our nation.

We urge all stakeholders to remain committed to the ideals of unity and progress for the prosperity of all Kenyans.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Raila Odinga', is positioned above the typed name.

Rt. Hon. Raila Odinga, EGH

JULY 25, 2024.



**JULY 12, 2024.**

**PRESS STATEMENT BY THE ODM CENTRAL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE:**

The Central Management Committee of ODM has met this morning to review the current affairs in the country.

This meeting took place against the backdrop of continuing protests against the government across the country, the rejection of the Finance Bill 2024, the dismissal of the entire Cabinet yesterday and the offer by President William Ruto for consultation across different sectors and political formations with a view to forming in his own words “a broad based inclusive government that can assist in transforming Kenya”.

We stand ready to support the country come up with measures that can restore lasting peace and stability and address the long standing issues like unemployment , the unending search for justice and equality, fighting corruption, negative ethnicity in our national life, instil a tradition for meritocracy in appointment to public office and ending unfair and punitive economic and taxation policies. This conversation in our view must come ahead of other conversations on the structure of our national governance going forward.

As a party, ODM has never shied away from stepping up and having difficult conversations whenever the destiny of our nation is at stake. Indeed it is said that it is in times of crisis that leadership emerges. The emerging issues and the urgent need to address them is not about rescuing the Kenya Kwanza regime. The Nation is bigger than, and distinct from any one of us. We see this as a chance to rescue our Nation and pull it back from the precipice.

We therefore welcome these developments in the hope that they will mark the beginning of honest and earnest efforts to address the myriad issues expressed by disappointed and angry youths and a huge segment of the Kenyan population.

As a party, we shall not fear to engage with the country, and when we do, we shall not do that in fear.

We believe in fighting injustice and dictatorship in all their manifestations because we believe every single member of the country has a right to hold opinions, to express those opinions and to be heard. This entire crisis was precipitated by a failure to listen to each other. It cannot be resolved by the same attitude. There is no table ODM will not go to, if the destiny of our nation is the main agenda. ODM will not object to the presence of any other person or group of people on that table no matter how outrageously different their view of the world is from ours.



## ORANGE DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

In order for us to have this National conversation, we call on the Government to take certain immediate steps to create the necessary environment. The decision to fire his cabinet was a good start in our view. But the feeling across the country is that there still exists an atmosphere of fear that makes it impossible for people to speak freely. Ruto must immediately fire the IG of Police, the Nairobi Police commander and apprehend all Police Officers implicated in the murders of the over 200 innocent Kenyans in peaceful protests since last year. We call for a national amnesty for all persons arrested or charged in connection with protests, and compensation for all victims of police brutality.

Time is of the essence fellow countrymen.

Senator Edwin Sifuna, MP.  
**SECRETARY GENERAL.**